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Abstract 
Political theories of corporatism from the late 1970s make turgid reading and rather deservedly disappeared down a 
theoretical rabbit hole. However, my doctoral thesis on Feminism and Unionism draws on that theoretical framework 
as well as socialist feminist theories to think about recent radical change in New Zealand labour relations. This paper 
outlines corporatist theories, looks at how these featured in some union/political thinking in New Zealand in the late 
1980s, and why, even though they are useful , they are inadequate to explain the labour market situation of New Zealand 
women and their unions. 
The shift from occupational awards to enterprise or indi-
vidual contracts Wlder the Employment Contracts Act 
1991representsaradicalchangeinthepattemofcorporat-
ism between 'capital' , 'labour' and 'the state' in New 
Zealand. Political theories of corporatism (Schmitter & 
Lehmbruch 1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982; Jessop 
1979) provide a framework for considering bargaining 
'reform' under NationaL and also the Compact between 
the NZ Council of Trade Unions (NZCIU) and the previ-
ousLabourgovemment(ACIU/IDU 1987;NZCIU 1988, 
1989). 
Labom relations legislation reflects the shifting interests 
and balance of power between the corporatist partners. 
However, 'labour' is not a single abstract entity but com-
prises women and men at work in very difficult situations 
in the labour markel I argue here that corporatist theory 
and corporatist strategies are gender blind, but not gender 
neutral. Nevertheless, corporatist theory offers a frame-
work for reviewing the change to enterprise contracts with 
regard to the collective bargaining power of women. 
Theorising Corporatism 
Corporatism was developed as a concept in political theory 
in the 1970s as part of ideal typologies of political repre-
sentation and political economy (Jessop 1979: 186-189). It 
refers to the institutionalisation of interest representation 
in exchange for state intervention. Corporatist arrange-
ments enable organisations representing capital and la-
bour to participate in the 'authoritative' formulation of 
policyfortheeconomy and society as a whole (Wassenberg 
1982:95). In retmn they submit to varying degrees of state 
regulation, particularly of bargaining between organised 
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labour and employers. 
C01poratism is often seen as a strategy of the state (rather 
than of capital or labour) aimed at 'unity, order. national-
ism and success' (Jessop 1979: 186), though these might 
equally be goals of state policy in egalitarian Sweden or 
fascist Italy (Regini 1982: 109). Discussions which focus 
on the political management of economic and social issues 
(Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982:26) have tended to: 
. . . treat the state as an autonomous subject .. able to 
impose its own goals on the economic order ... to con-
flate the growth of state support for private capital with 
state control over private capital and numf(y) the 
specificity of the corporatlst form of state. (Jessop 
1979:189-190) 
Corporatist theorising provided a framework for compari-
sons between social democracies (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 
1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982). Studies were often 
ahistorical, focused on conformity to a universal model 
(Rubery 1988:254) which could take on a prescriptive, 
almost Darwinian dimension. with Sweden as the most 
advanced example of corporatist development This ten-
dency can be detected in the ·strategic unionism' of the NZ 
Council of Trade Unions and Australian CIU (ACIU/ 
TDC 1987:NZCTIJ 1988. 1989: Harvey 1992), discussed 
later. 
In analysing change, corporatism may be seen, not as the 
amount of state intervention, but as the manner in which 
the state is articulated with the economic order (Jessop 
1979:188). In a political economy view, corporatist pat-
terns are politically and historically contingent arrange-
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Figure 1. Parliamentarism a la Jessop 1979 • representation and control 
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ments resulting from 'the balance of political forces medi-
ated through state fonns' (J essop 1979: 21 0). Since politi-
cal outcomes are never static nor pea manent, no particular 
corporatist arrangement should be privileged theoreti-
cally. Preferences reflect political interests. 
Bob Jessop (1982:193-6) discusses parliamentarism and 
corporatism as two distinct modes of formal articulation 
between representation and intervention (figmes 1 and 2). 
Corporatism involves 1epresentation of members (work-
ers or employers) within public 'corporations' (unions or 
employers' associations) constituted around the division 
of labour, fused with state intervention through these same 
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corporations to regulate members. Unions both represent 
members' collective bargaining power and bind them to 
collective agreements; they are confining as well as ena-
bling institutions. A parallel situation exists within na-
tional organisations representing employezs (V owles 1985; 
Brosnan, Walsh & Rowe 1985; Taylor & Greenslade 
1986; Wanna 1989)(figure2). Stateregulationofnegotia-
tions between the two provides governments with the 
opportunity to protect their own interests, both indirectly 
and through agreements or intervention. 
The pattern of representation and intervention at the beart 
of corporatism does not presuppose the fonns of organisa-
Figure 2. Corporations of interest representation and control • idealised 
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tion or levels of hierarchy at which c01poratist interaction 
is institutionalised Patterns are historically and culturally 
specific and subject to change, reflecting in the changing 
interests of 'capital', 'labour' and 'the state', as well as 
their differing power and material resources to pursue 
those interests. 
Although use of the tenn 'corporatism' is often intended to 
mean used fonnal negotiations between national leaders, 
interaction between 'c<aporations' may be institutional-
ised at different levels. Arthur Wassenberg' s ( 1982) analy-
sis of this is particularly relevant to the changing situation 
in New Zealand Interaction between the hieran:bically 
organised organisations of labour and capital occurs at the 
'micro' level of employees and employer. at the meso 
level of unions and employers, perhaps locally orregionally: 
and at the 'macro' level of national leaders. Wassenberg 
considers that corporatism, as industrial struggle by other 
means, is a device which may displace inherent conflicts 
of interest between labour and capital rather than resolve 
them. Apparent resolution - or institutionalised control - at 
one level may displace dissatisfaction or conflict to other 
levels. In his view: 
As long as the macro stage can be used for acts of 
symbolic polarisation. .. (and) micro stages continue to 
be beset by direct class confrontation, the meso level 
seems to become more and more the appropriate place 
for striking a bargain without too much publicity and 
without too much transparency concerning the exact 
share of responsibilities for the final outcome 
(Wassenberg 1982:85). 
Arthur Wassenberg was discussing European unions or-
ganised by industry rather occupation. However, this 
statement could describe labour relations in New Zealand 
and Australia where relations between labour and capital 
have traditionally been institutionalised at the meso level 
(figure 3). 
Meso Corporatism in New Zealand 
In New Zealand corporatism has traditionally operated at 
the meso level of unions and groups of employers through 
the state arbitration of wage awards. This system has been 
described as an 'historic compromise' between ' labour' , 
'capital' and ' the state' (Holt 1986; Jesson 1987; Simpson 
1991). A state-registered document was settled between 
the union with registered coverage of a particular labour 
market and representatives of interested employers. An 
award document set legally enforceable minimum wage 
rates and conditions for the occupations described in it and 
was legally enforceable on all employers who employed 
. such workers. From 1936 various focms of compulsory 
union membership belped extend this system to industri-
ally weak groups of workers- particularly female domi-
nated occupations- which had often it difficult to organise 
successfully. 
This centralised wage bargaining required little member-
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ship participation. As long as prosperity was shared 
through annual increases in award rates, meso level bar-
gaining did not require organisation or action at the 'micro' 
level of the worlcplace. In W assenberg' s (1982:85) phrase, 
the memberships of many unions remained 'anaethetised' . 
At the macro level Federation of Labour leaders interacted 
informally with business and political leaders, represent-
ing the viewpoint of 'the unions' (Skinner 1980; Vowles 
1985: 226). However, affiliated unions enjoyed consider-
able autonomy. 
The Arbitration Court was 'a political institution' (Brosnan, 
Smith & Walsh 1990:32) in that it was a site for negotia-
tion, conciliation and arbitration between representatives 
of labour and capital, bef<Xe a panel of Commissioners 
comprised of nominees of labour, capital and the state. It 
was constituted within a body of law recognising the 
inherent inequality of the 'master-servant' relationship 
rather than law governing civil contracts between pre-
swnedequals(Mulgan 1993;Ryan& Walsh 1993). Though 
at different times its rulings were considered unsatisfac-
tory by some or all three of the corporatist partners. they 
were pragmatic solutions, as much as legal ones, aimed at 
meeting the expectations of unions, employers and gov-
ernments. 
Meso level corporatism was a package deal through which 
wage bargaining was both supported and controlled. Ac-
cess to arbitration and compulsory union membership 
were traded against unions' right to strike. However, this 
package was not static, but reflected the changing interests 
of 'capital' ' labour' and ' the state' (Holt 1986). Through 
the 1970s and 1980s successive legislation introduced the 
option of direct bargaining, changed the form of compul-
sory unionism and arbitration and widened the narrow 
range of ' industrial issues'. 
As the interests of capital became more hegemonic in 
government policies (Oliver 1989; Goldfinch & Roper 
1993; Roper 1993), traditional bargaining arrangements at 
the meso-level were dismantled The Employment Con-
tracts Act, 1991 shifted the basis bargaining from the 
occupation totheenterpriseorindividual Negotiations for 
collective enterprise contracts - but not multi-employer 
contracts- could be supported by strike action but the court 
could only rule on legality and breech of contracts, once 
negotiated. 
The loss of meso level multi-employer bargaining dis-
placed conflict to the micro level of worksite disputes and 
individual grievances. Although individual rights were 
extended(Boxalll991:292; Walsh 1993:190),manywork-
ers in small finns have been unable to bargain at a mean-
ingful level of collectivity. Any macro-level solution to 
this will require a displacement of labour relations conflict 
to parallel party political and parliamentary arenas from 
which the Employment Contracts Act resulted. 
This outlines in the abstract and gender-blind language of 
corporatist theory the shifting political interests and chaog-
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Figure 3. Corporatism a la Jessop, 1979 & Wissenstein, 1982 - interest representation 
and control 
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ing labour relations framework in New Zealand. It also 
indicates the importance of that legislative framework in 
any consideration of the interests and strategies of both 
individual unions and the union movement as a whole. As 
Pat W alsh comments: 
Just as the unequal conflict between labour and capital, 
and the particular form it takes in each society, shape the 
State's industrial relations policies ... the relationship 
between unions and employers unfolds in the context of 
the institutional structure of the State's industrial rela-
tions policies (Walsh 1993:174). 
However, ' labour' -to take just one of corporatist partners 
-is not a homogeneous abstraction, but comprises men and 
women at work in different occupations in the labour 
market. How relevant are corporatist theories to a consid-
eration of women in the labour market? What are the 
effects of corporatist change on unions representing pre-
dominantly women within a labour market segregated by 
gender? 
Corporatist Theory and Women 
International comparative work on the position of women 
in the labour market (Ruggie 1984; Rubery 1988) suggests 
that it is not just labour relations or patterns of corporatism 
that need to be analy~ but the way other policies- fiscal, 
family, welfare or education -affect the labour market. J ill 
Rubery critiques theorists who seek a universal model of 
154 
boooooooooooooooooooo oooooooooooooooooo 
Workrorce 
behaviour applicable over time or between countries. 
One aspect of societies should not be singled out for 
crosscountry comparisons, as this would obscure the 
different ways in which parts of a society interrelate ... We 
need to understand the ways in which the system of 
industriaL labour market and family organisation inter-
relate and the role of the society's political and social 
values in maintaining these relationships before we 
could expect to make sense of the differences between 
countries (Rubery 1988:253). 
Nevertheless, on comparing studies from the United States, 
United Kingdom, France and Italy, Rubery recognises the 
importance of different systems of labour market organi-
sation and regulation in explaining cross-national differ-
ences in levels of male and female pay and in rates of 
change. 
To understand how job segregation acts to exclude 
women from higher paying iobs. one has to know the 
relevant divisions within the economy between 'good' 
and 'bad' employment positions. The fonn of these 
divisions is likely to be related to the pattern of collective 
bargaining and labour market regulation (Rubery 
1988:257). 
Underlying studies of corporatism are assumptions about 
patterns of regulation which reflect the norms of the 
countries examined. Union organisation originated in 
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Europe as fonns of closure around traditionally male 
crafts, which provided the labour for key industries as 
capitalism developed. 'Industrial relations • is aptly named 
in these countries since organised labour has primarily 
developed within industrial production sectors, with more 
recent organisation among state employees. Varying 
amounts of state regulation of low paid service wort in the 
private sector have occurred as an extension of this. The 
fact that this seldom involves union organisation and 
representation, as well as state control, goes largely 
unremarked by researchers and theorists. Yet this is the 
core of the 'secondary 'labour market in which wortersare 
most disadvantaged and in which women and ethnic mi-
norities are concentrated (Doering & Priore 1971; Barron 
& Norris 1976; Bowie 1983). If the labour m.arlcet out-
comes for marginalised social groups are to be changed, 
the nonns of labour relations bargaining and state regula-
tion need to be problematised, not merely assumed. 
To take up Wassenberg's argument that corporatism dis-
places conflict to other levels, it may be suggested that 
successful organisation and representation in industry 
displaces some of the fleXIbility needs of capitalism into 
'unorganisable • sections of the labour marlcel A British 
example is the way parttime employment for less than 16 
hours is expressly excluded from employment security 
protections and employer liability for various taxes and 
deductions (Beecbey 1987; Walby 1986:226-27). The 
result is a higher proportion of low paid women in parttime 
employment in Britain than in neighbouring countries or in 
New Zealand (Rubery 1988:262-266). Such an argument 
implicates the state and labour, as well as capital, in the 
maintenance of a ' secondary' labour market 
In New Zealand and Australia the regulation of wage 
bargaining took a distinctively different tack from the 
European one, and one which facilitated high levels of 
unionisation among women. Although most New Zealand 
labour history focuses on the corporatist trade-off between 
the right to strike and the right to state arbitration, a key 
difference from European and the United States has been 
regulation at the level of occupational markets, rather than 
industries or firms. A wards with blanket coverage and 
compulsory unionism gave unions a form of occupational 
closure. Access to arbitration allowed unions with little 
industrial strength to negotiate effectively in their particu-
lar section of the labour market. 
The system supported union representation for women in 
low paid service occupations, which are not unionised in 
most industrialisM countries. My case studies of unions 
covering clerical wort, nursing and cleaning document the 
logistics of organising small scattered worksites, lack of 
industrial leverage and personal vulnerability that are 
typical of women's low paid service work, as well as the 
moral constraints which undermine industrial action in the 
main professions for women. Occupational awards insti-
tutionalised differences between women's and men • s pay 
rates; nevertheless, high union representation and mini-
mum wage rates have meant a smaller gender pay gap in 
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New Zealand than in most OECD coWltries (Hyman 
1994:124-136). 
When the Employment Contract Bill was introduced, I 
was engaged in research on feminism and unionism. The 
new Act meant a unique opportunity to study two mark-
edly different labour relations regimes within the context 
of a single country. Other factors affecting the position of 
women, pointed to by Rubery, remained relatively con-
stant, with the National government following similar, if 
tighter policies in other areas to those under Labour 
(NACEW 1990: Briar, Munford & Nash 1992). 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 shifted the basis of 
bargaining from occupation to enterprise - a system closer 
the United States pattern rather than the macro-c01p0ratist 
Swedish one (Boxall1990). In the United States, the low 
paid service jobs typically held by women and ethnic 
minorities are seldom unionised. In 1989, for example, 
only 13% of women (and 20% of men) were unionised in 
the United States (Crain 1991:1157) and many women in 
low paid service jobs (and their children) are living below 
the official poverty line (Scott 1986). In contrast, in 1990 
60% of all New Zealand employees were covered by wage 
awards and 40% were union members, in roughly equal 
numbers for women and men (Brosnan, Smith & Walsh 
1990: 101). 
In my view, New Zealand women benefited from the 
traditional state supports to unionisation and bargaining by 
workers in scattered worksites and jobs which lacked 
industrial leverage. They also benefitted from union 
organisation which reflected the gendered structure of the 
labour market, meaning that women were organised into 
large unions with female dominated memberships. 
Women became more active in unionism from the mid-
1970s. By 1991 the number in paid and Wlpaid positions 
of union responsibility had greatly increased (PSA 1976: 
Geare, Herd & Howells 1979; Sarr, 1992). The most 
strongly female-dominated had women as union secretar-
ies and presidents. These leaders aimed to make union 
membership more relevant to women by prioritising pa-
rental leave, sexual harassment, pay equity and equal 
employment opportunity - all issues which addresssed 
women • s labour market disadvantage. These issues were 
raised in cross-union women's committees, and in forums 
within the 'labour' corporation. Most progress was made, 
however, in the political arena, through wide based cam-
paigns to changed the corporatist bargaining framework to 
include these issues (Dann 1985; Wilson 1992; CEVEP 
1994). 
Conflicting Demands for Flexibility 
In the 1980s institutionalised bargaining at the meso level 
came under pressure from different, contradictory de-
mands for change and greater 'flexibility · - not only from 
'capital '. but from different sections of ' labour' . 
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Women unionists were campaigning to extend the content 
of award negotiations to include issues related to gender at 
work and in the labour market Some unions had been 
blocked from negotiating over the introduction of new 
technology and health and safety issues, and a procedure 
for' new matters' was included in the Labour relations Act, 
1987. The 1987 Act also included discrimination and 
sexual harassment as grounds for personal grievance pro-
cedures. The State Sector Act, 1988 required government 
departments to implement equal employment opportunity 
programmes. The Employment Equity Act, 1990 ex-
tended this requirement to large private sector employers 
and introduced procedures for employment equity assess-
ments between male- and female-dominated occupations 
for incorporation into award negotiations. 
A longstanding tension between sections of 'labour' has 
been between those unions who benefited from state 
arbitration and those unions who at times felt they would 
do better to rely on industrial muscle - with most unions 
representing private sector female dominated occupations 
in the first group. Economic recession, government inven-
tion in wage rounds and wages rates falling against infla-
tion led these unions and Federation of Labour leaders to 
seek greater flexibility in the right to strike. Their position 
contributed to the removal of the right to arbitration on 
award negotiations through legislative changes in 1984 
and 1987 (Walsh 1989: 155). 
In 1989, without the backup of arbitration, award talks 
covering clerical workers, liceoced hotel clerical workers, 
licenced hotel workers, tearoom and restaurant workers 
and a number of smaller awards broke down for over a 
year. 1bese awards covered around third of all unionised 
women workers and presaged the gendered effects of the 
Employment Contracts Act, 1991. 
The main drive for 'flexibility' came from the New Zea-
land Business Roundtable (NZBR1), the lobby group 
representing large capital Smaller employers reported 
relative satisfaction with centralised bargaining 
(McAndrew & Hursthouse 1991, 1992). The Business 
Roundtable argued that bargaining reform would enable 
the labour market to respond efficiently to the changing 
needs of expanding and contracting industries. Flexibility 
in industry development was conflated with demands for 
greater flexibility from the 'over-priced' New Zealand 
worker (NZBRT 1987, 1988, 1990). While feminists 
argued that women's skins were systematically underval-
ued, free market advocates were suggesting that greater 
' flexibility ' would allow 'disadvantaged' Maori, Pacific 
Island and women workers to price themselves into a job 
(Brook 1990:76; NZ Treasury 1987:279). The Business 
Roundtable considered that labour market inefficiency 
and 'rigidity' resulted from minimum award rates, arbitra-
tion, compulsory unionism, set hours of work and penal 
payments. These were just the mechanisms developed 
during previous Depressions to support and protect indus-
trially weak groups of workers (Simpson 1987), particu-
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larly women. 
The Business Roundtable's agenda for labour market 
'reform • was adopted first by the Employers Federation, 
then the National government (Herbert 1990; Roper 1993; 
Walsh & Ryan 1993: 15). In corporatisttenns, a shift in the 
interests of large 'capital', supported by 'the state'- itself 
a large employer- led to employers • withdrawal from the 
meso-level 'historic compromise' with 'labour' at the 
meso level of institutionalisM wage bargaining. But 
leaders of' labour' had been strategising their own changes 
to the pattern of corporatism. 
'Strategic Unionism': Corporatism and the 
NZCTU 
As redundancies in industry and the state impacted on 
traditionally strong unions, NZcru leaders began to em-
phasise job retention, economic growth and influence on 
government policy, rather than industrial action. Rather 
than focusing on 'acts of symbolic polarisation' at the 
macro level (Wassenberg 1982:85), NZcru leaders ex-
pressed greater interest in and responsibility for economic 
growth (Campbell & Kirk 1983; Harris 1991, 1993). 
The modem industrial state ... had to develop and often 
manage the infrastructure ... A role for unions slots into 
that type of balanced, sovereign nation state {NZCfU 
1991:3). 
To balance the influence of the Business Roundtable. 
NZCI1J leaders sought to fonnalise this role at the macro 
level through a Compact with the Labour government 
providing greater consultation and union input into policy 
matters (NZCI1J 1988, 1990; NZ Govt 1989; TIJEA 
1989). 
Tripartite agreements are a hybrid form linking corp<nt-
ism and parliamentarism (Jessop 1982: 195). but the Com-
pact was never more than bipartite. It was primarily a 
strategy to realign the policies of labour movement and 
Labour government. In fact, it originated with the 
'corporatist tendency' within the Labour caucus and La-
bour Party which had been defeated by Labour's free 
market Ministers (Oliver 1989), but which began to gather 
strength in Labour's second term. 
NZCfU officials were strongly influenced by the Austral-
ian Accord between unions and the Labour government, 
bonowing the phrase 'strategic unionism' for their own 
Compact strategy (ACIU{fDC 1987; Willis 1985). Both 
Accord and Compact drew on corporatist models of con-
siderable historic success from Austria, Germany and 
Scandinavia. European models proposal in both countries 
to restructure the union movement on industry or sector 
lines, rather than occupations. By the late 1980s, however, 
corporatism was beginning tocrackinEurope, with slashed 
welfare in Sweden and state sector strikes in Germany in 
the early 1990s. In Australia the Accord and union 
restructuring were also drawing criticism from sections of 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
the labour movement and from feminists as of little benefit 
to women work:ezs (Ross, O'Lincoln & Willett 1986; 
Tanner 1989; NZJ::WA 1989; Windsor 1990; Pringle & 
Watson 1992:60). 
In New Zealand some dissent to 'strategic unionism' 
reflected a view of corporatism as collaboration (Harvey 
1992). But other unionists objected to the undemocratic 
way the vaguely worded Compact, then Growth Agree-
ment, was implemented. Also the Growth Agn~ement 
reimposed centralised control of the wage round for little 
concrete return. Some unions for female dominated occu-
pations considered its 'productivity' component ill-con-
ceived for service work. 
An integral strand of NZCnJ strategy was restructuring 
the 'labour' corporation by industry, then sector (Harvey 
1992:66; NZCnJ 1988, 1989)- 'because that is how the 
economy works' (Easton 1990; Hill1991). An industry-
based structure would amalgamate some small male craft 
unions into larger units and might facilitate union input 
into industry development However, it would fragment 
negotiations covering labour markets which spanned in-
dustries, splitting some large unions for female dominated 
occupations. The NZCnJ estimated, in response to criti-
cism, that three of its 14 proposed sector unions would 
have memberships with a female majority of about 65%. 
However, the few unions with a woman as union secretary 
have female majorities of 85% or more. 
The NZCTirs proposal for industry based unionism fol-
lows the pattern of the countries from which its corporatist 
models were drawn. However, OECD countries have 
greatly varying rates of female unionisation, and union 
organisational structures in which women are 
underrepresented have attracted criticism (Cockbum 1984; 
Milkman 1985; Crain 1991; Cobble 1991; ILO 1988; 
ICFI'U 1991). The papers of the Labour/NZCfU Com-
pact Committee reflected no analysis of this, nor of New 
Zealand's own very different arrangements. (Nor do 
NZCfU Compact publications mention the other macro 
level strategy of the time, the campaign for legislation to 
reassess the value of women's work.) 
In terms of corporatist theory, what the Compact required 
from unions was a more tightly organised structure which 
could deliver on decisions made by national leaders - that 
is, a structure designed to control as well as represent. A 
future tripartite Compact would require similarly tight 
organisation among employers. 2 
Following the 1990 election National declined continuing 
the Compact. However, the themes of bipartite corporat-
ism, union restructuring and industrial action rather than 
arbitration continue to shape NZCnJ strategies. In part, 
this reflects greatly weakened representation by unions for 
whom large scattered labour markets are more important 
than specific industries. It was these unions, and unions for 
female dominated occupations in particular, that bore the 
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brunt of bargaining 'reform'. 
The gendered impact of the Employment Con-
tracts Act 
The National government rapidly implemented most of 
the Roundtable agenda for labour market reform through 
the Employment Contracts Act, the repeal of the Employ-
ment Equity Act and cuts to benefit payments. 
In corporatist terms, the Employment Contracts Act dis-
mantled institutionalised arrangements at the meso level, 
fragmenting awards into thousands of entetprise negotia-
tion (Hill & Du Plessis 19933. Also at the macro level, the 
recent extensions of the bargaining framework to allow 
gender and race inequalities to be addressed were also 
dismantled. 
By September 1992,45% fewer employees had dropped 
from coverage by collective documents, with most of these 
in small private sector firms (Harbridge 1993:46). Micro-
level bargaining disproportionately decollectivised and 
deunionised women in private sector clerical. sales and 
service work (Sarr 1993; Hammer & Harbridge 1993; Hill 
& Du Plessis 1993). The Services Workers Union reported 
a 32% drop in membership; the Distribution & General 
Workers Union around 30%. The northern and southern 
clerical unions dropped 45% and amalgamated with the 
Service Workers Union, while the union covering clerical 
workers from Taupo to Dunedin was dissolved, with some 
members distributed to industry unions under the auspices 
of the NZCIU. The Amalgamated Workers Union. cov-
ering scattered, casualised but predominantly male iobs, 
suffered similar losses. Union membership in the state 
sector remained high, with nurses in both public and 
private health taking strike action around the country. 
Women's loss of collective bargaining power and an 
attack on penal rates in health and hospitality were re-
flected in a widening of the gender pay gap by early 1993. 
the year following the expiry of most awards (NZ Statistics 
1993). 
By 1993 deunionisation and amalgamations had also af-
fected women's representation in union leadership, with 
fewer union secretaries or presidents representing fewer 
women members (Sarr 1993). With the number of contract 
negotJ.ations and individual grievances dramatically in-
creased, even women-led unions are giving less attention 
to issues like employment equity, although this is by no 
means off the political agenda. 
Between Corporatism and Parliamentarism 
The corporatist theoretical model (figures 1 and 2) can 
facilitate consideration of the changes in New Zealand • s 
labour relations system and about how these have come 
aboutachieved. ClausOffeand H. Wissenthal(1985:202) 
have argued class struggle involves struggle about politi-
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cal forms as well as within political forms, and New 
Zealand labour history shows that this is equally true of 
labour relations. The interests of ·capital', 'the state • and 
' the unions' are pursued both within the institutional 
forums for wage negotiations and in other arenas in which 
the struggle is about the forms those institutions should 
take. 
The legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s were made 
through the political system of representation and control, 
but the political manoeuvring which led to the various 
changes occurred in the spaces between the political sys-
tem and the corporatist framework for labour relations 
negotiations (figure 1). 'Labour' and one group within 
politics initiated a formal corporatist arrangement - the 
Compact - which was short lived. In this particular ec(}-
nomic recession 'capital' and political groups aligned with 
it did not see their interests as lying in corporatist compro-
mises- its goals were already being successfully achieved 
by informal means and its agenda implemented through 
government policy and legislation. Particularly interesting 
was the extent of appointments of individuals representing 
the interests of' capital' to positions managing the restruc-
tming of the state's delivery /control system (TIJEA 1987). 
Links between the parliamentary system and the corpora-
tions of labour and capital at the macro level have been 
formalised through tripartite agreements in some Eur(}-
pean countries. However, these need to be analysed within 
the specific pattern of labour market regulation, with an 
eye to whether these protect and empower all sections of 
the workforce. Events in Sweden and Germany illustrate 
the fact that all corporatist arrangements are strategies 
within particular economic contexts and are historically 
contingent. 
In New Zealand tripartite talks occurred intermittently 
between the early 1970s and early 1980s, with little suc-
cess. As Lehmbruch (1982:24) observes, forms of corpo-
ratism in which contact is restricted to leaders at the top of 
autonomous hierarchies retain the option of a low cost 
'exit' -by discontinuing talks or as in 1990 by a change of 
government. This contrasts with the stability of the meso 
level award system, which brought unions and employers 
firmly into a system of negotiation. 
Although the NZBRT denounced award bargaining as 
inflexible, changes in the 1970s and 1980s had amended 
the traditional system to allow direct bargaining, enter-
prise and industry documents as well as occupational ones, 
and a wider range of issues. Without government interven-
tion and without access to compulsory arbitration re-
move<L a wider range of wage rate outcomes began to 
emerge (Harbridge 1990). In 1990 both the Clerical 
Workers Unions and the New Zealand Nurses Association 
were complaining that their rates had slipped against the 
core male trades. However, the legislative framework had 
been widened to include parental leave, sexual harass-
ment, equal employment opportunity and (briefly) pay 
equity. These changes benefitting women had been raised 
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within the 'corporation • of labour, but pursued through the 
political system to change some of the rules for meso 
corporatist bargaining. 
In the 1980s greater progress was made on gender issues 
in New Zealand than in other OECD countries. Occupa-
tional unionism led to female-dominated women-led or-
ganisations which prioritised these issues. These changes 
were not initiated by leaders at the macro-level; nor is it 
likely that such issues would be raised by industry-based 
unions. which would have lower proportions of female 
members and be less likely to be achieve women leaders. 
While men • s employment is typically patterned by indus-
try. the markets for women· s skins often span industries -
for example, cleaning, customer service and especially 
clerical work. Women· s labom market disadvantage 
operates through and is much more marked by occupation 
than by industry groupings. However, in New Zealand in 
the 1970s and 1980s union organisation reflecting gendered 
occupations provided the numerical strength to pursue 
common interests among women workers, facilitating the 
development of a distinctively feminist unionism. 
My own view is that bargaining at the meso level by 
occupation has potential to combine both worker protec-
tion and flexibility of content. Meso level bargaining by 
occupation provides the collective strengthen to allow 
meaningful bargaining by women in scattered service 
work, which is now being de unionised. The gendered and 
racially segregated nature of the labour market is more 
marked by occupation than by industry. since it is through 
the gender- or race-typing of jobs that earnings differen-
tials are organised (Cock bum 1985; W alby 1988; NACEW 
1990). Bargaining by occupation is more relevant than by 
industry for those with general skills, who are most in need 
of labour market protections. Bargaining by occupation 
also allows workers to organise around common concerns 
- not just overtly gender-specific ones like sexual harass-
ment, but also casualisation and changes to work hours, 
health hazards and professional issues. A more relevant, 
voluntary unionism needs not only to address ' the entire 
spectrum of needs that people have when they are em-
ployed as wage workers' (Offe & Wissenthal1985:179), 
but to build solidarity around commonalities of interest 
among specific groups. 
Conclusion 
The Employment Contracts Act introduced a radical change 
to corporatist arrangements in New Zealand. shifting wage 
negotiation from the meso to the micro level This has 
disproportionately deunionised women in sales, clerical 
and service work (Sarr 1993). Yet these are ... 
... the prototypic worker(s) of the post -industrial era ... the 
workers to whom organised labour must now appeal if 
it is survive. (Cobble 1991:76). 
Labour relations legislation and a union movement which 
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can disregard the decollectivisation of this section of the 
wortforce as 'unorganisable' needs to address ... 
•.• fimdamental questions about the definitions of w~ 
collective organisation and collective action, labour 
powez and the structme of labour law itself. (Crain 
1991:1158) 
My objective in this paper has been to share and critique a 
tbeoretical framewOik which may be of assistance in this. 
Future Research 
Patterns of cmporatism are outcomes of political agendas 
and political struggles. But an important contribution to 
tbese can be made by research agendas which infonn the 
process of policy making. So far, there has been analysis 
and critique at the level of politics and economics, and 
research findings are coming through which show the 
outcomes of collective negotiations and changes to levels 
of unionisation under the new legislative regime. 
But the philosophy behind the Act values individual 
freedoms, not collective ones. Along with freedom of 
association, the Act introduced the 'option' of an indi-
vidual employment contract for all employees. Where is 
the research investigating outcomes of individual employ-
ment contract negotiations? Exactly what happened to the 
estimated 336,000 workers who had dropped from collec-
tive coverage by September 1993 (Harbridge 1993:46) 
and the women in sales, clerical and service work who are 
no longeneptesented by a union (Sarr 1993) It's time we 
found the resources and the research design to take that one 
out of the 'too hard' basket 
Notes 
1. This draws on arguments from my doctoral thesis, 
Feminism&: Unionism in NZ: Organising the Markets for 
Women's Work, University of Canterbury, 1994. Case 
studies of unions covering clerical work, nursing and 
cleaning document differences of position and strategy in 
relation to mainstream unionism and legislative changes. 
2. The change to enterprise contracts removed award taDcs 
as a focus for collective organisation among employers. 
However, in 1992 the bargaining strategies recommended 
to employers by most industry associations were in line 
with Employers Federation/ Business Roundtable phi-
losophy. 
References 
ACTUffDC 1987 Australia Reconstructed: ACTUrrDC 
Missions to Western Europe. Canberra: Australian 
Government Publications. 
Beechey, Veronica. 1987 'Conceptualising Part-time 
Work'. InBeechey,UnequaiWork, 149-168.Lon-
don: Verso 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
Boxall, Peter 1991 'NZ's Employment Contracts Act 
1991: An Analysis ofBackgroun~ Provisions and 
Implications' . Australian Bulletin of Labour, 17 
Bowie, J. R. 1983 'The Dual Labour Market'. In Brian 
Easton (ed) Studies in the Labour Market. Wel-
lington: NZI F.R 
Briar, Celia, Robyn Munford & Mary Nash (eds) 1992 
Superwoman, Where Are You? Social Policy and 
Women's Experience. Palmerston North: Dunmore 
Press 
Brook, Penelope 1990 Freedom at Work. Auckland: 
Oxford University Press 
Brosnan, Peter, Pat WaJsb & P. Rowe 1985 'The 
lnactivities of Employer Unions'. NZ Journal of 
lndu.stria/ Relations 10: 1411-56 
Brosnan, Peter, David Smith & Pat Walsh 1990 The 
Dynamics of NZ Industrial Relations. Auckland: 
John Wiley 
Campbell, Rob & All Kirk 1983 After the Freeze: NZ 
Unions in the Economy. Wellington: PortNicholson 
Press 
Coalition for Equal Value Equal Pay 1993 Ju.st Wages: 
History of the Campaign for Pay Equity 1984-
1993. Wellington: CEVEP 
Crain, Marion 1991 'Feminising Unions: Challenging 
the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor' . Michigan 
Law Review 89: 1155-1221 
Dann, C~tine 1985 Up From Under: Women and 
Liberation in NZ: 1970-1985. Wellington: Alien & 
Unwin 
Easton, Brian 1990 Lecture to Workers Education Assn, 
Christchurch 
Goldrmch, Shaun & Brian Roper 1993 'Treasury • s Role 
in State Policy FormnJation in the Post-War Era' . 
In Brian Roper & Chris Rudd (eds) State and 
Economy in NZ, 50-73. Auckland: Oxford Univer-
sity Press 
Hammond,Suzanne & Raymond Harbridge 1993 'The 
Impact of the Employment Contracts Act on Women 
atWork'.NZJournal oflndustriaiRelations 13(1) 
Raymond Harbridge 1990 'Flexibility in Collective Wage 
Bargaining in NZ: Facts & Folklore'. NZJ ournal of 
lndu.strial Relations 15(3): 241-250 
Raymond Harbridge (ed) 1993 Employment Contracts: 
NZ Experiences. Wellington: Victoria University 
Press 
159 
Harris, Peter 1991 'Reshaping the Economic Agenda'. 
Papers of the Union/l'ertiary Research Confer-
ence, Wellington 
Harris, Peter 1993 'Industry Policy: A Key to Jobs and 
Job Secmity'. Wellington; NZCIU 
Harvey, Owen 1992 'The Unions and the Government 
The Rise and Fall of the Compact'. In John Deeks 
& Nick Perry, Controlling Interests: Business, the 
State and Society in NZ, 59-77. Auckland: Auck-
land University Press 
Herbert, Patricia 1990 'Coup in Employers Group Brings 
Shift Rightwards' . The Press, 30 March 
Hill, Linda 1991 'Labour Market Segregation and the 
Case for Occupational Unions - Part I: Organising 
Labour Market Segments; Part IT: The Case Against 
Industry Unionism'. Unpublished paper 
Hill, Linda & Rosemary Du Plessis 1993 'Tracing the 
Similarities, Identifying the Differences: Women 
and the Employment Contracts Act' . NZJ ournal of 
Industrial Relations 18(1): 31-43 
Holt, James 1986 Compulsory Arbitration in NZ: The 
First Forty Years .. Auckland: Auckland Univer-
sity Press 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
1992 Equality: The Continuing Challenge - Strat-
egies f or Success. Brussels, ICF I U 
International Labour Organisation 1988 Women at 
Work, 2, Geneva 
Jesson, Bruce 1987 Behind the Mirror Glass. Auckland: 
Penguin 
Jessop, Bob 1979 'Corporatism, Parliamentarism and 
Social Democracy'. In Philippe C. Schmitter & 
Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds) Trends Toward 
Corporatistlntermedialion, 185-211.London: Sage 
Lehmbruch, Gerhard & Philippe C. Schmitter (1982) 
Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. London: 
Sage 
McAndrew, Ian & Paul Hursthouse 1990 'Southern 
Employers on Enteiprise Bargaining', NZ Journal 
of Industrial Relations 15(2) 117-128 
McAndrew, Ian & Paul Hursthouse 1991 'Reforming 
Labour Relations: What Southern Employers Say'. 
NZ Journal of Industrial Re/a/ions 16(1): 1-12 
Milkman, Ruth 1985 'Women Workers, Feminism and 
the Labor Movement since the 1960s' . In Milkman 
(ed) Women, Work and Protest: A Century of VS 
Women's Labour Movement, 300-319. London: 
160 
Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Mulgan, Margaret 1993 'Women at Work: Ensuring 
Equity in the Employment Relationship: The Case 
for a Minimum Code' NZ Journal of Industrial 
Re/a/ions 18(1): 9-14 
National Ad~ry Council on the Employment of 
Women 1990 Beyond the Barriers: The State, the 
Economy and Employment, 1984-90. Wellington 
NACEW /Dept of Labour 
NZ Council ofTrade Unions 1988 The NeedforChange: 
Challenges for the Trade Union Movement of To-
day. Wellington: NZCTIJ 
NZ CouncilofTrade Unions 1989 Strategies for Change: 
Challenges for the Trade Union Movement of To-
day. Wellington: NZCIU 
NZ Council of Trade Unions 1990 'The Compact and the 
Direction of Economic Policy•. March 1990 
NZ Government/NZCTU 1989 'The Compact: State-
ment by the Government and the NZCTIJ' . Decem-
ber 
NZ Clerical Workers Association 1989 The Australian 
Accord and the NZ Compact. Wellington: NZCW A 
NZ Treasury 1987 Government Management: Brief to 
the Incoming Government. Wellington: GP 
Offe, Claus & H. Wissenthal 1985 'Two Logics of 
Collective Action' . In Offe, Disorganised Capital-
ism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and 
Politics, 170-220. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 
Oliver, W. Hugb 1989 'The Labour Caucus and Eco-
nomic Policy Formation, 1981-84'. In Brian Easton 
(ed) The Making of Rogernomics, 11-52. Auck-
land: Auckland University Press 
Prlngle, Rosemary & Sop hie Watson 1992 "'Women's 
Interests" and the Post Structuralist State'. In 
Michelle Barrett & Anne Phillips, Destabilising 
Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates, 53-73. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
Regini, Marino 1982 'Changing Relations between La-
bour and the State in Italy: Towards a Nt»-
corporatist System'. In G. Lehnbruch & P. C. 
Schmitter, Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Mak-
ing, 109-130. London: Sage 
Roper, Brian 1983 'A Level Playing Field? Business 
Political Activism and State Policy Formation' . In 
BrianRoper&ChrisRudd(eds)StateandEconomy 
in New Zealand 147-171. Auckland: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
Ross, Liz, Tom O'Lincoln & Graham Willett 1986 
Labour Accord: Why it's a Fraud. Brunswick, Vie: 
Socialist Action 
Rube1 y ,.fill1988 Women in Recession. London: Routledge 
&KeganPaul 
Ruggie, Mary 1984 The State and Working Women: A 
Comparative StudyofBritainandSweden. Princeton 
University Press 
Ryan, Rose & Pat Wub 1983 'Common Law versus 
Labour Law: The NZ Debate'. Paper to Industrial 
Relations Conference, Auckland, January 
Sarr, Patricia 1992 Out of the Chorus Line: The Progress 
ofWomen in NZ Unions. Wellington: NZCIU 
Sarr, Patrida 1993 Shifting Sands: Women in NZ Unions 
1993. Wellington, NZCIU 
Scbmitter, Pbilippe C. & Gerbard Lebmbrucb (eds) 
1979 Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. 
London: Sage 
Scott, Hilda 1986 Working Your Way to the Bottom: The 
Feminisation of Poverty. Boston: Pandora 
Simpson, Tony 1987 'The Holt Narrative and the Indus-
trial Relations Agenda', NZ Journal of Industrial 
Relations 12 143-150 
Simpson, Tony 1990 The Slump: The Thirties Depres-
sion, Its Origins and Aftermath. Auckland: Pen-
gum 
Skinner, Sir Tom 1980 Man to Man. Auckland: 
Whitcoulls, 1980:seealsoObituary,NZHerald,13 
November 1991 
Stamtics NZ 1993 'Hot Off the Press-Quarterly Employ-
ment Survey: February and May/June 
Strinati, Domioic 1991 ·A Ghost in the Machine? The 
State and the Labour Process in Theory and Prac-
tice'. In D. Knight & H. Willmott (eds) Labour 
Process Theory, 209-243. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Taylor, Raymond & Bevan Greenslade 1986 'The Ac-
tivity of Employer Unions in Perspective', and 
Peter Brosnan & Pat Walsh, 'Reply to Taylor & 
Greenslade', NZ Journal of Industrial Relations 
11: 191-192 
Trade Union Education Authority 1987 'The Business 
Rom1dtable • 
Trade Union Education Authority c.1989 'Compact 
Resource Kit' , undated 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
Vowles,Jack 1985 'Business&Labour:MajorOrganised 
Interests in the Political Economy of NZ' .In Hyam 
Gold (ed) NZ Politics in Perspective, 216-231. 
Auckland: Longman Paul 
Walby, Sylvia 1986 Patriarchy at Wolk. Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
Walby, Sylvia (ed) 1988 Gender Segregation at Work. 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press 
W abb, Pat 1989 'A Family Fight? Industrial Relations 
Refonn Under the Fourth Labour Government'. In 
Brian Easton (ed) The Making of Rogernomics, 
149-170. Auckland University Press 
Wabb, Pat 1993 'The State and Industrial Relations in 
NZ'. In Brian Roper (ed) State and Economy in 
New Zealand 1-25. Auckland: Oxford University 
Press 
Wanna,Jobn 1989 'Centralisation Without Corporatism: 
The Politics of NZ Business in Recession', NZ 
Journal of Industrial Relations 14: 1-15 
Wassenberg, Arthur 1982 'Neo-Corporatism and the 
Quest for Control: The Cuckoo Game' . In Gerhard 
Lehmbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter, Patterns of 
Corporatist Policy-Making, 83-107. London, Sage 
Willis, Ralpb c. 1985 Accord: The First Two Years. 
Canberra: Ministry of Employment and Industrial 
Relations 
Wilson, Margaret 1992 'Employment Equity Act 1990: 
A Case Study in Women's Political Influence, 
1984-90' . In John Deeks & Nick Perry, Controlling 
Interests: Business, the State and Society in New 
Zealand, 113-131. Auckland: Auckland Univer-
sity Press 
Windsor, Kim 1990 'Making Industry Work for Women'. 
In Sophie Watson (ed) Playing the State: Austral-
ianF eminist Interventions, 137-151. London: Verso 
Author 
Linda Hill is a PhD student in the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Canterbury, Private Bag 
4800, Christchurch. 
161 
